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Abstract
Bioeconomic analyses of spatial fishery models have established that marine reserves can
be economically optimal (i.e., maximize sustainable profit) when there is some type of spatial2
heterogeneity in the system. Analyses of spatially continuous models and models with more
than two discrete patches have also demonstrated that marine reserves can be economically4
optimal even when the system is spatially homogeneous. In this note we analyze a spatially
homogeneous two-patch model and show that marine reserves can be economically optimal6
in this case as well. The model we study includes the possibility that fishing can damage
habitat. In this model, marine reserves are necessary to maximize sustainable profit when8
dispersal between the patches is sufficiently high and habitat is especially vulnerable to
damage.10
2
Introduction
Marine reserves are zones where extractive fishing is prohibited (Lubchenco et al., 2003).12
While there is growing scientific consensus that marine reserves are useful for biological
conservation, their economic costs and benefits are debated (Hart, 2006; Hart and Sissenwine,14
2008), with consequences for their political feasibility as a fisheries management tool. To
help understand the biological and economic circumstances under which marine reserves may16
be economically beneficial, theoreticians have turned to studying bioeconomic models that
include a spatial dimension (Herrera and Lenhart, 2010). The analysis and interpretation of18
these models can be difficult, so to keep matters simple models often divide the habitat into
two patches, one of which is designated as an unfished reserve. Analyses of two-patch models20
have found that reserves can be economically beneficial (i. e., increase yield or profit) when
there is an asymmetry in either the biological or economic characteristics between the reserve22
and fished patches. In particular, closures may support elevated catch levels if they export
larvae or adult fish into fished areas (Pezzey et al., 2000; Costello and Polasky, 2008), if they24
are sited in areas that are more expensive to fish than open areas (Sanchirico and Wilen,
2001; Sanchirico et al., 2006), or if they stabilize catch levels in the face of environmental26
stochasticity (Hannesson, 2002).
What is more surprising is that reserves can be economically optimal even when space is28
completely homogeneous. Using a partial differential equation model that treats space as a
one-dimensional continuum, we have shown that marine reserves can be profit maximizing30
even when the biological and economic parameters are the same at every location (Moeller
and Neubert, 2013). Similarly, White et al. (2008) found economically optimal reserves in32
a model that approximates a continuous habitat with a system of many identical patches
arranged in a ring; however, they did not find any case where reserves were required to34
maximize profit when there were only two patches. Their study followed on from a paper by
White and Kendall (2007) who found that fishing yield could be improved when one patch36
was closed to fishing and the other was completely harvested. They did not investigate the
3
effect of closed areas on profit.38
These results leave open the possibility that reserves might only be profit maximizing in a
spatially homogeneous model if there are more than two patches. The purpose of our present40
paper is to present a counterexample to that idea. We show here that marine reserves may
emerge as part of the economically optimal (i. e., profit maximizing) management strategy42
even in completely homogeneous two-patch settings.
What distinguishes our model from previous two-patch models (aside from spatial ho-44
mogeneity) is that we account for the possibility that fishing may negatively impact habitat
quality. Destructive fishing practices like bottom trawling reduce the complexity of benthic46
habitats, affecting survivorship of fish populations (Collie et al., 1997; Watling and Norse,
1998; Hiddink et al., 2006). Here, we assume that fishing directly reduces the habitat’s car-48
rying capacity, with the severity of the habitat damage scaling with fishing effort intensity
(Auster, 1998; Fogarty, 2005). This habitat-quality feedback, coupled with the dispersal of50
fish between patches, drives an asymmetrical distribution of fishing effort, in which habitat
quality is preserved in one half of the habitat to sustain elevated fish stocks and profits.52
Although habitat damage as a result of fishing is often neglected in the bioeconomic litera-
ture, some theoretical work has attempted to incorporate these feedbacks into marine reserve54
models (see Armstrong and Falk-Petersen (2008) for a review). These treatments generally
take a retroactive perspective, focusing on the recovery of the habitat fraction in reserve56
(Rodwell et al., 2003; Armstrong, 2007), or are limited in their economic analysis of reserve
viability (Lindholm et al., 2001; Upton and Sutinen, 2005) (but see Moeller and Neubert58
(2013) for an exception).
We begin with a brief examination of the optimal harvest of a single population. This60
will allow us to address the effects of harvest-related habitat impacts in isolation from spatial
considerations. It will also provide context for the results of our analysis of the two-patch62
model. As it turns out, dispersal changes the relationship between optimal fishing effort and
the degree to which fishing impacts habitat quality.64
4
Analysis and Results
One-Patch Model66
Imagine a stock whose density N(t), in the absence of harvesting, is governed by the logistic
differential equation:68
dN
dt
= rN
(
1− N
K
)
. (1)
In most bioeconomic models, the effect of harvesting is included in model (1) by subtracting
a fishing mortality term from the right hand side. Thus70
dN
dt
= rN
(
1− N
K
)
− qEN, (2)
where E is a measure of the fishing effort (Clark, 1990). The positive proportionality constant
q is the so-called “catchability coefficient;” it depends upon characteristics of the habitat and72
on the harvesting technology. Variables, parameters, and their typical units are summarized
in Table 1.74
In our model, we follow Fogarty (2005) and imagine that in addition to increasing fish
mortality directly, fishing also damages habitat such that it reduces the environmental car-76
rying capacity K. In particular, we will replace the constant K in (2) with
K(E) =
K0
1 + gE
. (3)
The larger the value of the parameter g, the more carrying capacity is suppressed by effort.78
In this sense, g represents the sensitivity of the habitat to fishing. Substituting our effort-
dependent carrying capacity (3) into the stock equation (2) gives80
dN
dt
= rN
[
1− (1 + gE)N
K0
]
− qEN. (4)
For a fixed level of effort, the equilibrium stock density is found by setting dN/dt = 0
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in equation (4) and solving for N . There are two solutions: 0 and another equilibrium that82
we will call Nˆ . Whenever Nˆ is positive, it is the only stable equilibrium. When it is not
positive, 0 is stable.84
Now imagine that the effort level is under the control of a sole-owner who can sell the
harvest at a price p per unit biomass and faces a fixed cost per unit effort c. Then, at86
equilibrium, the owner will generate profit at the rate Π:
Π = pqENˆ − cE. (5)
A reasonable objective for the owner would be to maximize the equilibrium profit (5) by88
prudently choosing the effort level E.
Our model (4)-(5) has six parameters (r, K0, g, q, p, and c; see Table 1). By introducing90
dimensionless versions of the variables
n =
(
1
K0
)
N, τ = rt, h =
(q
r
)
E, pi =
(
1
rpK0
)
Π, (6)
we find that equations (4) and (5) are transformed to92
dn
dτ
= n[1− (1 + γh)n]− hn (7)
and
pi = h(n− w). (8)
These two equations depend on only two parameters: the dimensionless habitat sensitivity94
γ =
(
r
q
)
g, (9)
and the dimensionless cost
w =
(
1
qpK0
)
c. (10)
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In this rescaled version of our model the sole owner’s problem is to maximize the dimension-96
less profit pi by choosing the dimensionless effort h.
For model (7) the stable equilibrium stock size, found by setting dn/dτ = 0, is given by98
n =

(1− h)/(1 + γh), if 0 ≤ h ≤ 1
0, if h > 1.
(11)
As we see in Fig. 1, the equilibrium stock declines with effort and declines more quickly if
habitat is vulnerable to fishing damage (i. e., when γ > 0). By substituting the equilibrium100
size (11) into (8) and differentiating with respect to h, one can find the profit maximizing
effort level102
h∗ =

(1− w)/2, if γ = 0 and w ≤ 1,
γ−1
[
−1 +√(1 + γ)/(1 + γw)] , if γ > 0 and w ≤ 1,
0, if w > 1,
(12)
as well as the resulting optimal stock size
n∗ =

(1 + w)/2, if γ = 0 and w ≤ 1,
γ−1
[
−1 +√(1 + γ)(1 + γw)] , if γ > 0 and w ≤ 1,
1 if w > 1.
(13)
The maximum sustainable profit, pi∗, is then given (using equation (8)) by h∗(n∗ − w).104
By plotting h∗, n∗ and pi∗ as functions of γ (Fig. 2), we see that as habitat sensitivity
increases, equilibrium profit decreases, and less effort is required to maximize profit. De-106
spite this decrease in effort, the equilibrium stock size also decreases as habitat sensitivity
increases. These results are consistent with those of Fogarty (2005) who studied yield (as108
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opposed to profit) using a similar model.
Two-Patch Model110
Let us now expand our view slightly and consider two stocks, N1 and N2, coupled by in-
dividuals who disperse between them with constant per capita emigration rate D. Assume112
that these two stocks live in completely identical habitats. That is, each habitat “patch”
has exactly the same population growth rate and responds to harvesting in exactly the same114
way. The population dynamic portion of our model then becomes
dNi
dt
= rNi
(
1− Ni
K(Ei)
)
− qEiNi +D(Nj −Ni), for i = 1, 2, j 6= i, (14)
where K(E) is again given by formula (3). If we also assume that the costs, prices, and116
catchability coefficients are identical in both patches then the sole owner’s objective is to
maximize118
Π˜ =
2∑
i=1
pqEiNi − cEi (15)
over nonnegative values of E1 and E2.
Before analyzing model (14)-(15), we again rescale the variables and parameters (listed120
in Table 1) via
ni =
(
1
K0
)
Ni, τ = rt, hi =
(q
r
)
Ei, δ =
D
r
, and, p˜i =
(
1
rpK0
)
Π˜ (16)
to arrive at the dimensionless version of the two-patch population dynamic model122
dni
dτ
= ni [1− (1 + γhi)ni]− hini + δ(nj − ni), (17)
8
(for i and j equal to 1 or 2, and with j 6= i) and the economic model
p˜i =
2∑
i=1
hi(ni − w). (18)
This dimensionless form (17)-(18) reemphasizes the fact that the two patches in the model124
are completely identical: harvesting effort costs the same (w) in each patch, each patch is
equally sensitive to harvest (γ), and individuals in both patches have the same emigration126
rate (δ).
Given all this spatial homogeneity, it would be reasonable for a sole owner to think that128
applying effort equally, at the rate h∗, in each patch would maximize profit. It turns out
that this is not always true (Fig. 3). In the absence of dispersal (δ = 0) or when habitat130
is invulnerable (γ = 0), it is indeed optimal to apply the same fishing effort in each patch.
However, when both δ and γ are positive, it can be optimal to focus all of one’s effort in one132
patch and treat the other patch as an unfished reserve.1 The more sensitive the habitat, the
lower the emigration rate at which reserves become optimal (Fig. 4). In the limit of extreme134
habitat sensitivity (γ very large), fishing in both patches would generate infinitesimal profit
due to habitat degradation. Thus, so long as δ > 0, it becomes more profitable to close one136
of the patches and catch emigrating fish in the other. The threshold values of δ and γ above
which reserves become optimal depend upon the cost of fishing w. The larger w, the more138
sensitive the habitat or the higher the emigration rate must be for reserve optimality.
In addition to allowing for the possibility of spatially asymmetric harvesting, the two-140
patch model behaves differently than the single-patch model with regard to the relationship
between optimal effort and habitat sensitivity (compare Fig. 2, Fig. 5). Optimal aggregate142
effort in the two-patch model (h∗1+h
∗
2) does not monotonically decline with habitat sensitivity.
Rather, it declines until the point at which it becomes optimal to stop harvesting in one of144
the patches. Aggregate effort then increases until the habitat becomes extremely sensitive,
1Because the patches are identical, it does not matter which patch is fished and which is placed in reserve.
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when it decreases again. Aggregate optimal stock size (n∗1 +n
∗
2) and aggregate optimal profit146
(p˜i∗) decrease with habitat sensitivity, just as they do in the one-patch model.
Discussion148
Three points emerge from our brief analysis. The first is that we have found a counter
example to the idea that marine reserves would not be optimal in a homogeneous two-patch150
model. In the (admittedly stylized) system we analyzed here the two patches are intrinsically
identical, both biologically and economically. Nevertheless, we have shown that it can be152
most profitable to harvest in one patch and establish a reserve in the other. This result,
along with our previous analysis of a continuous-space model (Moeller and Neubert, 2013)154
and the results of White and Kendall (2007) and White et al. (2008), lead us to a warning:
Though it may be tempting to manage spatially homogeneous systems in a homogeneous156
manner, one should resist this temptation absent a careful analysis.
The second point is that ignoring feedbacks between fishing and habitat quality can lead158
to qualitative errors in the design of spatial management strategies. In our model, marine
reserve creation is only economically optimal when fishing damages habitat. Thus, from a160
purely economic perspective, reserve benefits may be limited by the context of the affected
fishery. However, in the many cases where fishing damages habitat, our results establish162
that the economic benefits of marine reserves should not be dismissed out of hand. The
dependence of these results on habitat sensitivity and dispersal rates serves to highlight the164
importance of tailoring management strategies to particular fisheries and their biological
effects.166
The third point is that, if habitat is sensitive to damage from fishing, there may be
substantial value to be gained by implementing technologies that reduce the impact of fishing168
gear. For example, in the one-patch system, altering gear to reduce γ from 10 to 0 would
result in a quintupling of profit (Figure 2). Optimal effort levels also depend upon habitat170
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sensitivity, with potential implications for fishery employment (Neubert and Herrera, 2008).
Our results come from intentionally simple models, in which we have assumed environ-172
mental homogeneity and analyzed equilibrium outcomes. While these models served our
purpose of illustrating the optimality of marine reserves even in homogeneous two-patch174
systems, we note some important caveats. First, by focusing on model equilibria, we have
ignored time-dependent processes such as discounting, or the potentially dynamic response176
of habitat quality to fishing pressure. Thus, our results do not account for the potential
costs of management transitions to the profit-maximizing steady state, which may impact178
the economic optimality of marine reserves depending on the timescale of analysis. Second,
we have not considered the many ways that environmental heterogeneity can influence profit-180
maximizing fishing distributions. Other authors have considered these effects, and shown
that reserves are more likely to be optimal in places where costs (either implicit, as where182
fishing is more deleterious to fish stocks, or explicit, as where costs per unit of fishing effort
are greater) are high relative to other locations (Pezzey et al., 2000; Costello and Polasky,184
2008; Sanchirico and Wilen, 2001; Sanchirico et al., 2006).
Over the past decade, increasing attention has been paid to the economic benefits of186
both terrestrial and marine reserves (e.g., Grafton et al., 2005; Naidoo and Adamowicz,
2005). These benefits include activities that take place within reserves (e.g., ecotourism), and188
spillover of benefits into adjacent areas (e.g., pollination and pest control services). Reserves
can also act as a population refuge for harvested stocks, and have long been implemented190
for their conservation benefits in this regard. Our model highlights a special intersection
of conservation and economic interests by focusing on a case in which the act of harvesting192
a stock (fishing) reduces the carrying capacity (damages the habitat) of that stock. Thus,
the establishment of reserves protects both a source stock population and intact habitat,194
enhancing the economic value of the fishery.
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Table 1: Variables and parameters used in the models, together with their typical units.
Symbol Description Typical Dimensionless
Units Version
Variables:
N,Ni stock, in patch i tonnes n, ni
E,Ei fishing effort, in patch i vessels h, hi
Π, Π˜ profit dollars · day−1 pi, p˜i
t time days τ
Parameters:
r per capita population growth rate day−1
K0 carrying capacity without harvest tonnes
g habitat sensitivity vessel−1 γ
q catchability coefficient vessel−1 · day−1
D per capita emigration rate day−1 δ
p market price of stock dollars · tonne−1
c cost of fishing effort dollars · vessel−1 · day−1 w
16
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Figure 1: Equilibrium of the dimensionless “one-patch” model (7)-(8). Stock size (n) and
profit (pi) are shown as functions of effort (h). For the solid curves γ = 0; for the dashed
curves γ = 5. For this figure the dimensionless cost of effort w was set to 0.1.
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Figure 2: Optimal equilibrium management of the one-patch model (7)-(8). Profit-
maximizing effort (h∗), stock size (n∗) and maximum profit (pi∗) are shown as functions
of the dimensionless habitat sensitivity (γ). For this figure the dimensionless cost of effort
w was set to 0.01.
Figure 3: Total equilibrium profit for the two-patch model (17). Contours of total equilibrium
profit (p˜i, equation (18)) are shown as functions of effort in each patch. Profit maximizing
combinations of effort are marked with an red star. For this figure the dimensionless cost of
effort w was set to 0.01.
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Figure 4: Reserve implementation thresholds for the two-patch model (17). Contours show
where management strategies transition from fishing both patches (below the contour), to
where one patch is fished and the other is treated as an unfished reserve (above the contour),
as a function of habitat sensitivity γ and emigration rate δ. Each contour represents a value
of w.
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Figure 5: Optimal equilibrium management of the two-patch model (17)-(18). In each plot,
the top curve represents the total of the quantity (either effort, stock size, or profit) in both
patches as functions of habitat sensitivity γ. The distance between the top and bottom
curves (shaded) gives the contribution to the plotted quantity from one of the two patches.
Because these quantities vary rapidly for small γ, the top row shows results for 0 ≤ γ ≤ 5.
The bottom row shows the same quantities over a wider range, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 100. For this figure
the dimensionless cost of effort w was set to 0.01 and the dimensionless per capita emigration
rate δ was set to 1.
